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INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION-Scherk v. AlbertoCulver Co., The Exemption of International Contracts
from the Wilko Doctrine Voiding Agreements to
Arbitrate Securities Disputes
INTRODUCTION

Arbitration may be defined as a voluntary agreement by the parties
to a contract which provides that any controversy arising out of the
contract will be settled by a neutral body or panel provided for in the
contract, rather than by litigation in the courts. Arbitration has been
long approved and widely used in the settlement of commercial disputes in a speedy and efficient manner by arbitrators familiar with the
customs and practices of the trade, without the formalities and complexities of judicial proceedings.'
When a controversy arises between two parties who have made an
agreement in connection with the purchase of securities to arbitrate
future disputes, a court is faced with the difficult problem of reconciling the right of the plaintiff to have his dispute determined in a judicial forum and the right of the defendant to resort to arbitration. In
Wilko v. Swan, 2 the United States Supreme Court held that section 14
of the Securities Act of 19331 voided an agreement between the seller
and purchaser of securities to arbitrate all future controversies arising
from their transactions. In resolving the conflict between the Federal
Arbitration Act 4 and the Securities Act of 1933,' the Court stated
1. See, e.g., Holtzman, Arbitration in East-West Trade, 9 INT'L LAWYER 77 (1975);
Monroe, Commercial Arbitration: A Substitute for Franchise Contract Litigation?, 26
ARB. J. 147 (1971).
2. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
3.
15 U.S.C. § 77n (1933). It provides:
Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provison of this subchapter or of the rules
and regulations of the Commission shall be void.
4. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1970).
Before the enactment of this statute, the federal
"common law" of arbitration was held to be that agreements to submit future disputes
to arbitration were revocable and unenforceable. United States Asphalt Refining Co.
v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1933).
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that these acts involved two congressional policies which are not
easily reconcilable. On the one hand, Congress has manifested an intention to promote the use of arbitration as a prompt, economical and
adequate method of resolving controversies where the parties are willing to accept a non-judicial solution. On the other hand, Congress has
enacted the Securities Act to protect the rights of investors and has
forbidden the waiver of any of those rights. The Court concluded that
the public policy considerations involved in the Securities Act invalidate an arbitration agreement made before the controversy arose.6
The resolution of the conflicting congressional policies is further
complicated where the securities dispute occurs in the context of an
international contract. In such a situation, the resolution of the conflicts between various policies must be made through the consideration of not only domestic goals, but international goals as well.
In June, 1974, the Supreme Court decided the case of Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,' which concerned the enforceability of arbitration
clauses in an international contract involving a securities transaction.
The Court held that the Wilko doctrine was inapplicable to an international contract negotiated by knowledgeable businessmen advised
by competent legal counsel.8 This article will examine the Scherk decision in light of Wilko, international developments, and domestic
legislation in the area of commercial arbitration subsequent to the
Wilko decision, in order to appraise the soundness and the desirability
of the Supreme Court's rationale with respect to the "international
contract" exemption from the Wilko doctrine. A proper understanding of the questions involved requires an introduction to the controlling statutes.
THE RELEVANT U.S. CODE PROVISIONS

Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 9 makes it unlawful
for any person by use of instrumentalities of interstate commerce or
6. 346 U.S. at 438.
7. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
8. The Scherk case involved the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§
78a-78hh (1934), whereas Wilko involved the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a77aa (1933).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1934). It provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange-..
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
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the mails to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe. Rule lOb-5,10 promulgated by the SEC in 1942 to implement section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, makes it unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material fact or
to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made not misleading, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security. The fundamental purpose of section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5 was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor, and thus to achieve a high standard of business
ethics in securities transactions."
Rule lOb-5 has absorbed most of the general anti-fraud provisions
in the federal securities laws,' 2 and is by now generally recognized as
the most potent and versatile instrument in the armamentarium of
federal securities regulation. It has been applied to numerous and
widely diverse categories of securities transactions, including insider
trading on the basis of undisclosed material information, insider "tipping" of information to selected friends and contacts, misleading cor3
porate publicity, and a variety of forms of broker-dealer misconduct.1
The jurisdictional provision of the Securities Exchange Act, section
27,' 4 provides that the federal district courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all violations of the Act; and the anti-waiver provision,
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
10. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973). It provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
11. See, e.g., Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970); Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969); Cant v. A.G. Becker & Co.,
Inc., 374 F. Supp. 36 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Reube v. Pharmacodynamics, Inc., 348 F. Supp.
900 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
12. Note, Rule 10(b) and the Outside Director's Dilemma, 35 U. PITt. L. REv. 818,
821 (1974).
13. See Note, The Controlling Influence Standard in Rule lOb-5 Corporate Mismanagement Cases, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1007, 1007-08 (1973).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1934). It provides in part:
The district courts of the United States . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction
of violations of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all
suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder.
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section 29(a), 16 voids any condition, stipulation, or provision binding
any person to waive compliance with any provision of the Act or the
rules thereunder. 6 Agreements to arbitrate future securities disputes
have been held to constitute unenforceable stipulations or provisions
attempting to deprive the federal courts of exclusive jurisdiction in

such matters.1

7

The courts have regularly held that foreign nationals are subject to
section 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5 of the Securities Exchange Act and are
accountable in the federal courts for securities act violations committed either in whole or in substantial part within the United States to
the injury of American investors.'
It appears, therefore, that the 1934 Act allows an American plaintiff alleging that it has been defrauded by a foreign national in violation of the Act to bring suit in the federal district courts, whenever
there are sufficient minimal contacts with the United States, notwithstanding any arbitration agreement made before the dispute arose.
Subsequent to the Wilko decision,' 9 on June 10, 1958, a special
conference of the United Nations Economic and Social Council
adopted the Convention of the Recognition and Enforcement of For15. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1934). It provides:
Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder,
or of any rule of an exchange required thereby shall be void.
16. This section is quite similar to section 14 of the Securities Act of 1933 which
was involved in Wilko. See note 3 supra. The Court in Scherk stated that "[wihile
the two sections are not identical, the variations in their wording seem irrelevant to the
issue presented in this case." 417 U.S. at 514 n.7.
17. See, e.g., Kavit v. A.L. Stamm & Co., 491 F.2d 1176 (2d Cir. 1974); Ayres v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1084 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Maheu
v. Reynolds & Co., 282 F. Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Moran v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 422 Pa. 66, 220 A.2d 624 (1966).
18. Travis v. Anthes Imperial Limited, 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973); Leasco Data
Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972); Investment
Properties International, Ltd. v. I.O.S., Ltd., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
93,011
(S.D.N.Y. 1971); Roth v. Fund of Funds, L.T.D., 279 F. Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
aff'd, 405 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 975 (1969); SEC v. Myers,
285 F. Supp. 743 (D. Md. 1968); Ferraioli v. Cantor, 259 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y.
1966); Fontaine v. SEC, 259 F. Supp. 880 (D.P.R. 1966); SEC v. Gulf Intercontinental
Finance Corp., 223 F. Supp. 987 (S.D. Fla. 1963); Note, ExtraterritorialApplication of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 94 (1969); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)

OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §

17 (1965).

19. In Wilko, the relevant section of the Federal Arbitration Act which favoured the
enforcement of arbitration agreements is section 3, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1970), which provides:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States
upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such
arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that
the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under
such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of
the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms
of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.

Loyola University Law Journal

Vol. 6: 738

eign Arbitral Awards." In 1970, the United States acceded to the
treaty,2 1 and Congress passed Chapter 2 of the United States Arbitration Act,2 2 in order to implement the Convention. Section 123 of the
new chapter provides for the enforcement of the United Nations convention in the American courts.
Thus, when a dispute arises and one party desires to force a recalcitrant party to abide by his agreement to resolve the dispute through
arbitration, the recalcitrant party may be compelled to appear and
participate in the arbitral procedure under section 1 of Article II of
the Convention,2 4 which recognizes such an agreement. And, when a
defendant has been served with process by the plaintiff initiating judicial proceedings with respect to the subject matter of the arbitral
agreement, in disregard of the plaintiffs agreement to resolve the
matter by arbitration, the defendant may move the court to stay litigation while arbitration proceedings are carried out. This is accomplished by utilizing section 3 of Article II of the Convention,2" which
directs the courts to refer the parties to arbitration. Section 626 of the
new chapter also authorizes the federal courts to direct the arbitration
to be held outside the United States, if the parties have so provided.
The Convention provided that the recognition and enforcement of
arbitration agreements or awards may be refused if the arbitration
concerns a subject matter not capable of settlement by arbitration,'
if the agreement is null, void, or inoperative,28 if the arbitration is contrary to the public policy of the enforcing country,2 9 or if the agree20.
21.
22.
23.

U.N. Doc. No. E/CONF. 26/9/REV. 1 (1958).
[1970] 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997.
9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (1970).
9 U.S.C. § 201 (1970). It provides:

The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards of June 10, 1958, shall be enforced in United States courts in accordance with this chapter.
24. Id., section 1 of Article II. It provides:
Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under which
the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have
arisen or which might arise between them in respect of a defined legal relation-

ship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration.

25.

Id., section 3 of Article II.

It provides:

The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this
article, shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitra-

tion, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.
26. 9 U.S.C. § 206 (1970). It provides:
A court having jurisdiction under this chapter may direct that arbitration be
held in accordance with the agreement at any place therein provided for,
whether that place is within or without the United States. ...
27. 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1970), section 1 of Article II and section 2(a) of Article V.
28. 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1970), section 3 of Article II.
29. 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1970), section 2(b) of Article V.
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ment is not valid under the laws to which the parties have subjected
30
it.
It appears, therefore, that the Federal Arbitration Act requires that
a dispute should be arbitrated, even outside the United States if the
parties have so provided, unless the agreement to arbitrate is not enforceable under one or more of the grounds stated above.
The issue in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. was whether an arbitration clause in an international contract involving a securities transaction, negotiated by parties of equal bargaining power, is enforceable if
the plaintiff alleges that it has been defrauded in the acquisition of
certain businesses in violation of the Securities Exchange Act. In resolving this issue, the Court considered the two congressional policies
which are manifested by the enactment of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, providing for judicial settlements of all disputes involving securities transactions, and the enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act and the 1970 implementation of the Untied Nations Convention, providing for the referral of the parties to arbitration in
accordance with their agreement to arbitrate all disputes which might
arise between them in the future.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The plaintiff, Alberto-Culver Co., is an American company incorporated under the laws of Delaware with its principle office in Melrose Park, Illinois. It manufactures and distributes toiletries and hair
products in national and international markets. The defendant, Fritz
Scherk, is a German citizen residing at the time of trial in Switzerland.
Prior to the transactions in issue, Scherk was engaged in the manufacture and sale of cosmetic products in Western Europe. The principle
manufacturing operations were conducted by Scherk in facilities situated in Berlin, Germany, and owned by Scherk through a sole proprietorship called Firma Ludwig Scherk (FLS). Scherk also owned interrelated business entities known as Scherk Establissement Vaduz
(SEV), a Lichtenstein entity, and Lodeva Herstellung und Vertrieb
Kosmetischer Artikel GMBH (Lodeva), a German entity, both of
which have no corresponding counterparts in the United States. SEV
was operated by Scherk as a holding company licensing the sale and
distribution of Scherk's cosmetics on an international basis under a
variety of trademarks. Lodeva was dormant and remained so at the time
of trial.
30.

9 U.S.C. § 201 (1970), section I(a) of Article V.
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During the 1960's, Alberto-Culver decided to expand its overseas
operations, and in June, 1967, it contacted Scherk in Germany to explore the possibility that Scherk might sell his European cosmetic
business. In November, 1967, a representative of Alberto-Culver visited Scherk in Germany to pursue negotiations for such acquisition.
In December, 1967, the president of Alberto-Culver met with a representative of Scherk in Chicago, Illinois. The negotiations were terminated at that point.
In February, 1968, Alberto-Culver contacted Scherk in Berlin and
negotiations were subsequently resumed. An agreement in principle
was reached at this time concerning the basic terms for Alberto-Culver's acquisition of Scherk's business entities, SEV, FLS, and Lodeva;
the details of the agreement were hammered out at Alberto-Culver's
main office in late May and early July, 1968. Scherk was present in Illinois for this latter meeting. A written contract was ultimately prepared and signed in Vienna, Austria, by Scherk in February, 1969.
The contract contained a number of express warranties whereby
Scherk guaranteed the sole and unencumbered ownership of his
trademarks. As to the acquisition of SEV, the contract contained an
arbitration clause which provided:
The parties agree that if any controversy or claim shall arise out of
this agreement or the breach thereof and either party shall request
that the matter shall be settled by arbitration, the matter shall be
settled exclusively by arbitrationin accordance with the rules then
obtaining of the International Chamber of Commerce, Paris,
France, by a single arbitrator, if the parties shall agree upon one,
or by one arbitrator appointed by each party and a third arbitrator
appointed by the other arbitrators. ,In case of any failure of a
party to make an appointment referred to above within four weeks
after notice of the controversy, such appointment shall be made by
said Chamber. All arbitration proceedings shall be held in Paris,
France, and each party agrees to comply in all respects with any
award made in any such proceeding and to the entry of a judgment
in any jurisdiction upon any award rendered in such proceeding.
The laws of the State of Illinois, U.S.A. shall apply to and govern
this agreement, its interpretation and performance. 3 1
The arbitration clauses relating to the transfer of the other two business entities of Scherk were similar to the above clause.
The closing of the transaction was accomplished in Geneva, Switzerland, in June, 1969. Nearly one year later, Alberto-Culver discovered that the trademark rights purchased from Scherk were subject to
31.
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substantial encumbrances. A dispute arose, and Alberto-Cuiver attempted to rescind the contract; it tendered the businesses to Scherk,
who refused to accept the tender.
Scherk first took steps to institute arbitration in early 1971; however, a request for arbitration was not filed with the International
Chamber of Commerce until November 9, 1971. Alberto-Culver
commenced this action for damages and other relief in the District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois on June 11, 1971, alleging
that it was defrauded in the acquisition of these businesses in violation
of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act3 2 and rule lOb-5 as
promulgated thereunder.3 3 In response, Scherk filed a motion to dismiss the action for want of personal and subject matter jurisdiction as
well as on the basis of forum non conveniens, or, in the alternative, to
stay the action pending arbitration in Paris pursuant to the agreement
of the parties. Alberto-Culver opposed this motion and sought a prelininary injunction restraining the prosecution of arbitration proceedings. The district court denied Scherk's motion to dismiss, and granted a preliminary order enjoining Scherk from proceeding with
arbitration. In taking these actions, the district court3 4 relied entirely
on the Supreme Court's decision in Wilko v. Swan, which held that an
agreement to arbitrate could not preclude a buyer of securities from
seeking a judicial remedy under the Securities Act, in view of the language of section 14 of the Act, barring "[a]ny condition, stipulation,
or provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter. . .. "I'
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, with Judge Stevens
dissenting, affirmed upon what it considered the controlling authority
of the Wilko decision.8 6 In a 5 to 4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that, in the context of the international
agreement which the purchase and sale of business represented, the
arbitration clause would be enforced.
RESOLVING THE CONFLICT BETWEEN

Two CONGRESSIONAL POLICIES

In Wilko v. Swan, a customer brought suit for damages under sec32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1934).
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973).
The memorandum opinion of the district court is unreported.
15 U.S.C. § 77n (1933).
Alberto-Culver Co. v. Scherk, 484 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1973).
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tion 12(2) of the Securities Act 37 against a brokerage house alleging
that his purchase of stock was induced by false representations concerning the value of the shares. The defendant responded that the
plaintiff, Wilko, had agreed to submit all controversies arising out of
the purchase to arbitration, and moved to stay the trial of the action
pursuant to section 3 of the Arbitration Act 8 until arbitration was
completed in accordance with the terms of the agreement.
The Court found that two congressional policies, not easily reconcilable, were involved. On the one hand, the Federal Arbitration Act
stressed the need for avoiding the delay and expense of litigation, and
directed that such agreements be valid, irrevocable and enforceable in
federal courts. On the other hand, the Securities Act was designed to
protect the investors by requiring issuers, underwriters and dealers to
make full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and to prevent fraud in their sale by
creating a special right to recover for misrepresentation. 9 .Tbe Court
decided that the intention of Congress concerning the sale of securities would be more readily attained by holding that the anti-waiver
provision of the Securities Act 40 invalidates an agreement for arbitration of issues arising under the Act.
The Wilko doctrine has regularly been applied to claims arising under the Securities and Exchange Act because of the similarity between
the anti-waiver language of section 29(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act and section 14 of the Securities Act.4 1
The Court in Wilko took a dim view of arbitration 42 and decided
37. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1933).
Any person who--

It provides:

(2) offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by the provisions of
section 77c of this title, other than paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of said
section), by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of a prospectus
or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact
or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements,
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading
(the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not
sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall 'be liable
to the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at law
or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration
paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer

owns the security.

See text accompanying note 19 supra.

38.

9 U.S.C. § 3 (1970).

39.
40.

346 U.S. at 431, 438.
15 U.S.C. § 77n (1933).

41.

See notes 3 and 16 supra.

42.

English courts traditionally considered irrevocable arbitration agreements as
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that the exercise of judicial direction is required in order to protect the
investors and assure the effectiveness of the Securities Act.4 The
Court noted that arbitrators are often laymen who make their awards

without explanation of their reasons, that they do not make a complete record of their proceedings, and that the Federal Arbitration
Act does not authorize judicial review of the arbitration awards to
correct any erroneous interpretation of the statutes by the arbitrators.4 4
Alberto-Culver argued that the Wilko doctrine makes its agreement to arbitrate disputes arising under the contract with Scherk similarly unenforceable in view of its contentions that Scherk's conduct
constituted violations of the Securities Exchange Act.4 5 It pointed to
the "infirmities of arbitration" as applied to its dispute with Scherk in

that successful prosecution of a section 10(b) claim almost always requires extensive pre-trial discovery, but arbitration may not provide
for any discovery; and in that the wide choice of venue granted by the
Securities Exchange Act would be defeated if prior agreements to
arbitrate Securities Exchange Act violations were enforced.4 6
In regard to this contention, it should be noted that the Wilko case
involved a clear disparity of bargaining power between an ordinary
"ousting" the courts of jurisdiction, and refused to enforce such agreements for this reason. This view was adopted by American courts as part of the common law up to the
time of the adoption of the Arbitration Act in 1925. See H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1, 2 (1924).
43. 346 U.S. at 437.
44. Id. at 436-37. The English law, unlike the Federal Arbitration Act, authorizes
judicial determination of legal issues aising during the course of an arbitration proceeding. Id. at 437. A recent article proposed that Congress should adopt some of the provisions of the English law. Comment, Commercial Arbitration Under the Federal
Act: Expanding the Scope of Judicial Review, 35 U. PIsr. L. REv. 799, 813-15 (1974).
See other criticisms of arbitration in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36
(1974), decided only 4 months before Scherk, where the Court stated:
Moreover, the factfinding process in arbitration usually is not equivalent to
judicial factfinding. The record of the arbitration proceedings is not as complete; the usual rules of evidence do not apply; and rights and procedures common to civil trials, such as discovery, compulsory process, cross-examination,
and testimony under oath, are often severely limited or unavailable. See
Berhnhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956); Wilko v. Swan, 346
U.S., at 435-437. And as this Court has recognized, "[airbitrators have no
obligation to the court to give their reasons for an award." United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, at 598. Indeed, it is the informality of arbitral procedure that enables it to function as
an efficient, inexpensive and expeditious means for dispute resolution. This
same characteristic, however, makes arbitration a less appropriate forum . . .
than the federal courts.
id. at 57-8.
45. The Court did not decide the question whether the acquisition of Scherk's business was a securities transaction within the meaning of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5
of the Securities Exchange Act, since Scherk did not assign the adverse ruling on that
question as error. 417 U.S. at 514 n.8. The dissent considered the promissory notes
issued by Alberto-Culver for Scherk's assets to be "securities." Id. at 523.
46. Brief for Respondent at 19, Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
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customer pitted against a big brokerage house, and that the arbitration
agreement was contained in a standard form margin contract.4 7 As the
Securities and Exchange Commission argued in its amicus brief in
Wilko, "[t]he Securities Act of 1933 was designed primarily to protects
4
the less-informed members of the public against the professionals.
This argument is supported by the presidential message to Congress
urging the passage of the Securities Act so as to add to the ancient rule
of caveat emptor the further doctrine of "let the seller also beware, '
and by the decisions of numerous federal courts.5 0
Of course, it can hardly be said that the agreement in Scherk involved a disparity of bargaining power or a form contract. The negotiations were conducted over a period of nearly 2 years by skilled lawyers
and businessmen representing both parties. As Judge Stevens pointed
out in his dissent in the court of appeals:
[I]n transactions which are sufficiently large and complex that the
parties typically contemplate the possibility of future controversy,
the method of resolving forseeable disputes is itself a proper subject
of bargaining. In the international market, the inability to agree
on a neutral forum quite clearly may have an impact on the price
of the transaction, or even the acceptability of a prospective purchaser. 5 1
It could, therefore, be argued that the rule of Wilko v. Swan does not
apply to an international agreement where no disparity in either information or bargaining power is likely to be present, and that the parties
to such an agreement should be required to honour their bargain. 2
47. 346 U.S. at 429. But see the dissenting opinion of Justice Frankfurter concluding that the record did not show that "the plaintiff [Wilko] in opening an account had
no choice but to accept the arbitration stipulation .... ." Id. at 439-40.
48. Wilko v. Swan, 98 L. Ed. at 171; see Note, Arbitration Under the Securities Act
of 1933, 49 Nw. U. L. REv. 101 (1954); Note, Arbitration Clause in Brokerage Agreement, 18 ALBANY L. REV. 262, 264 (1954).
49. 346 U.S. at 430-31.
50. See, e.g., SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.
1973); Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 342 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1965), rev'd on other
grounds, 383 U.S. 363 (1966); Can-Am Petroleum Co. v. Beck, 331 F.2d 371 (10th Cir.
1964); Garfield v. Strain, 320 F.2d 116 (10th Cir. 1963); Texas Continental Life Ins.
Co. v. Bankers Bond Co., 187 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Ky. 1960).
51. Alberto-Culver Co. v. Scherk, 484 F.2d 611, 617 (7th Cir. 1973) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
52. For practical reasons, the rule of Wilko v. Swan may still be applied to domestic
agreements even when there is no evidence of disparity of information or bargaining
power. As Alberto-Culver pointed out:
In each case the district court would be required to inquire into the relative
sophistication of the parties [and] the disparity in their bargaining power
[such that] [s]ubstantial discovery would clearly be necessary, and in many
cases the district court would actually be deeply enmeshed in the merits of the
section 10(b) controversy before it could even decide the question of arbitrability.
Brief for Respondent at 26 and 27, Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
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However, the Court did not rule on the issue of whether the decision in
Wilko should be limited to situations where the parties exhibit a disparity of bargaining power, because of its disposition of the case on
other grounds. 58 The Court found "significant" and "crucial" differences between the agreement involved in Wilko and the one involved in
Scherk; Wilko's contract to purchase securities from Swan was a
domestic agreement, whereas Alberto-Culver's contract to purchase the
business entities belonging to Scherk was a "truly international agreement."5 4 The international contract was defined as "any contract touching two or more countries."5 5
The two decades that followed the Wilko decision have seen some
dramatic changes in the number of international agreements involving American businessmen. In 1950, United States direct investment
abroad is estimated as having totalled $11.8 billion, but by 1960 the
amount had nearly tripled to $31.9 billion. In 1970, United States
foreign investments totalled $78.1 billion, and by 1972 the amount
had reached $94.0 billion which represents an increase of approximately 700 percent over the 1950 amount. 56 While United States investments abroad have been increasing significantly, foreign investments in this country have also been on the rise. The book value of
foreign direct investments in the United States increased from $3.3
billion in 1950 to $6.9 billion in 1960 and eventually to $14.4 billion
in 1972, which represents an increase of approximately 340 percent
57
over the 1950 amount.
Businessmen have traditionally preferred arbitration over litigation; they regard arbitration as a process which combines finality of
decision with speed, low cost, and flexibility in the selection of principles and mercantile customs to be used in solving a problem. In international transactions, there is an additional reason for choosing arbitration, namely arbitration is often superior to adjudication of local
53. Id. at 512 n.6.
54. Id. at 515.
55. Id. at 516.
56. 1974 INT'L ECONoMrc REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 15; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
MANUFACTURERS, COMMENTS ON THE INT'L AcrIvrTEs OF U.S. MULTINATIONAL CORPS.
8 (1973); A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO INT'L BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS XXV (W.S. Surrey &
C. Shaw ed. 1963).
57. BUREAU OF CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS OF THE
UNITED STATES 782 (1974); 1974 INT'L ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 62.
Western European countries hold the vast majority of foreign direct investment in the
United States, over 70%; Canada accounts for another 25%, with the rest widely scattered among other countries. Id. at 59. The recent relative shift of financial power
to the oil-producing countries will probably result in a sharp climb in foreign investments in the United States in future years. See, e.g., Friedman, Who's Afraid of Foreign
Take-Overs?, N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1975, § 3 (Business and Finance), at 1, col. 4.
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courts in terms of: (1) neutrality of forum; (2) avoidance of personal jurisdiction problems; and (3) enforcement of the award.5 8
To meet the expanding international activities of American businessmen, and with the support from the bar, industry, labour and
business, 9 President Johnson, in 1968, urged Congress to enact
Chapter 2 of the Arbitration Act," the implementing legislation required before the United States could ratify the United Nations Convention which had been first promulgated in 1958.1 By 1970, the
United States had become a party to it.62
The Supreme Court also has recognized the indispensability of an
advance agreement by parties engaged in international transactions
with respect to the manner in which future disputes may be settled.6"
In MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,6 4 a German corporation
(Unterweser) agreed to tow the off-shore drilling rig of an American
corporation (Zapata) for Louisiana to the Adriatic Sea under a contract providing that "[a]ny dispute arising must be treated before the
London Court of Justice. '65 The rig was seriously damaged in a severe storm and was towed to Tampa, Florida, where Zapata sued Unterweser in federal district court, alleging negligent towage and
breach of contract. Unterweser moved to dismiss or stay the suit, and
sued Zapata in the High Court of Justice in London. The district court
58. Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049, 1051
(1961) [hereinafter cited as Quigley]; Ginsburg, Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Civil Judgments: A Summary View of the Situation in the United States, 4
INT'L LAWYER 720, 737-39 (1970); Govindaraj, Foreign Arbitral Awards and Foreign
Judgments Based Upon Such Awards, 13 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1465 (1964).
59. 116 CONG. REC., 91st Cong., 2d Sess., July 6, 1970, p. 22731.
60. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (1970).
61. The history of the Convention is summarized in HEIGHT, CONVENTION ON THE
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL

AwARDs (1958),

U.S.

DEL.

REP.

62. That the enforcement of international arbitration is raised to the level of government policy is supported by the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade Agreement of 1972 which provided
that:
Both governments encourage the adoption of arbitration for the settlement of
disputes arising out of international commercial transactions concluded between natural and legal persons of the United States of America and foreign
trade organizations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
67 DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 595-97 (1972).
Similar expressions of policy are included in the U.S.-Polish Trade Agreements of
1972. See DEP'T OF COMMERCE NEWS FACT SHEET, JOINT AMERICAN-POLISH TRADE
COMMISSION, 2d Sess., November 4-5, 1972.

63. Judicial support for arbitration was slow to manifest itself. Alberto-Culver Co.
v. Scherk, 484 F.2d 611, 616 n.2 (1973) (Stevens, J., dissenting). In the opinion of
Judge Stevens, "[slince 1953 the policy of encouraging the settlement of disputes by
arbitration has received increasingly strong [judicial] endorsement ....
".Id.
at 616
(citations omitted).

64.

407 U.S. 1 (1972).

65.

Id. at 2.
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denied Unterweser's motion to stay the action pending determination
of the London suit, and enjoined Unterweser from prosecuting the
London suit. 6 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed,6 7
and on petition for rehearing en banc, adopted the panel's judgment. 68 On certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the
court of appeals. Chief Justice Burger, expressing the views of seven
members of the Court, stated:
For at least two decades we have witnessed an expansion of overseas commercial activities by business enterprises based in the
United States. The barrier of distance that once tended to confine
a business concern to a modest territory no longer does so. Here
we see an American company with special expertise contracting
with a foreign company to tow a complex machine thousands of
miles across seas and oceans. The expansion of American business
and industry will hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn
contracts, we insit on a parochial concept that all disputes must be
resolved under our laws and in our courts. 69
Thus, the reasoning of the Court in support of its favourable view
of forum-selection clauses was based chiefly on the express need to facilitate international commerce. The same reasoning in fact should
apply to arbitration agreements in international transactions. In the
absence of excessive bargaining power, the parties are entitled to certainty in arranging their affairs. The view that a dispute arising in the
United States must be resolved in United States courts is "provincial."'7 0
The Court in Scherk held that an agreement to arbitrate before a
specified tribunal is, in effect, a specialized kind of forum-selection
clause that determines not only the situs of the suit but also the procedure to be used in resolving the dispute.71
66. In re Unterivesir Reederei, GMBH, 296 F. Supp. 733 (M.D. Fla. 1969), a! 'd,
428 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970).
- 67.
428 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970).
68. 466 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1971).

69.

70.
71.

407 U.S. at 8-9.

Id. at 12.
As Judge Stevens pointed out in the court of appeals:
mhe Zapata case did not involve the sale of securities and therefore is not
controlling here. Moreover, the Chief Justice expressly limited his opinion to
international agreements "unaffected by fraud," 407 U.S. at 12 .... Nevertheless, I believe the policy considerations which underlie [Zapata] are relevant
here.
484 F.2d at 616 n.3.
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority of the Supreme Court in Scherk, further explained that the fraud qualification of Zapata "does not mean that any time a dispute
arising out of a transaction is based upon an allegation of fraud, as, in this case, the
clause is unenforceable. Rather, it means that an arbitration or forum-selection clause
in a contract is not enforceable if the inclusion of that clause in the contract was the
product of fraud or coercion." 417 U.S. at 519 n.14.
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Thus, the Court held that the public policy favouring enforcement
of an arbitration agreement in an international commercial contract
entered into between parties of equal bargaining power outweighs the
domestic policy expressed in the Securities Exchange Act granting to
the courts exclusive jurisdiction of cases involving fraud in the sale of
securities.
THE CONCERN OF THE DISSENT

Justice Douglas filed a strong dissenting opinion in which three
other justices joined.7 ' The main features of the dissent will be analyzed below.
The dissent considered the Wilko doctrine to be peculiarly appropriate in the Scherk situation where an American plaintiff has alleged
a violation of the securities law by a foreign national, especially since
huge foreign investments are being made in American companies.
"American standards of fairness," the dissent insisted, should govern
the destinies of American investors.7"
This reasoning is not very persuasive. Since the American companies have also made massive capital investments overseas, 74 it surely
does not follow that "American standards of fairness" should apply
worldwide so as to protect the American investors. In international
contracts both parties desire a neutral forum, preferably one which is
equally convenient to each party. This would remove some of the inherent bias or advantage gained by a plaintiff litigating in his "home
territory." So long as the parties were of equal bargaining power and
dealt with each other at arm's length, there is no reason why they
should not be bound by their agreement. This is not a case where a
sizeable brokerage house is attempting to avoid the Securities Act by
enforcing a fine-print arbitration clause against an ordinary purchaser
of securities, where no countervailing policy is present. The policy
considerations involved in resolving international commercial disputes should transcend what the courts feel to be "American standards of fairness," so as to stimulate and encourage world trade. The
majority rightly felt that to insist that "American standards of fairness" must govern, when the parties have agreed to adjudicate else72. The majority consisted of Justices Stewart, Burger, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist; the dissent consisted of Justices Douglas, Brennan, White, and Marshall.
73. 417 U.S. at 528 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
74. In 1972, United States foreign investments amounted to approximately 6.5 times
the foreign investments in the United States. See the materials cited in notes 56 and
57 supra.
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where, demeans the standard of justice elsewhere in the world and unnecessarily exalts the primacy of United States law over the laws of
other countries.75
The second major concern of the dissent is that the international
contract "talisman" might be invoked in a situation where, for example, an interest in a foreign company was sold to an ordinary American customer, with the arbitration clause appearing in a fine print
form contract.7 6 This, of course, is a serious consideration since the
application of the Scherk doctrine to such an "international contract"
would force the average customer, in the words of the dissent, "to arbitration in Paris to vindicate his rights. ' 77 In dicta, the Court said
that "situations may arise where the contacts with foreign countries
are so insignificant or attenuated that the holding in Wilko would
meaningfully apply." 8 Thus, the Court has limited the Scherk doctrine to those contracts which are truly of international character; any
potential abuses of this doctrine may be dealt with accordingly by the
courts.
The most important argument proffered by the dissent is that neither the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards nor the Federal Arbitration Act justifies
abandonment of the public policy that securities claims be heard exclusively by the courts simply because a contract has an international
character.7 9 It is submitted that this contention is not justified for the
following reasons.
There are four distinct situations in which the Convention permits
the non-recognition and non-enforcement of arbitral agreements and
awards:
(1.) where the arbitration concerns' 80 "a subject matter [not] capable
of settlement by arbitration;
(2.) where the "agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed;" 8 '
(3.) where ,the arbitration is "contrary to the public policy of that
country ;-282
75. 417 U.S. at 517 n.l1.
76. Id. at 529.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 517 n.l1.
79. Id. at 524.
80. 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1970), section I of Article II and section 2(a) of Article V.
81. Id., section 3 of Article IL.
82. Id., section 2(b) of Article V.
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where "'the said agreement is not valid under the law to which
the parties have subjected it." s

The first ground was chosen by the Convention "in order to take
proper account of the laws in force in many countries which prohibit
the submission of certain questions to arbitration. ' 4 This ground
seems to be inapplicable in Scherk since there is no statute, not even
the Securities Exchange Act, 5 which expressly prohibits the submission to arbitration of a particular question or subject.
Under the second ground, 8 the Securities Exchange Act becomes
relevant because of its anti-waiver provision which might make the arbitration agreement null and void. Under the fourth ground, Illinois
law is applicable since the parties subjected their agreement to that
law; however, according to conflict of laws doctrines, the Illinois law
provision includes federal law. 7 Therefore, in this case the outcome
would be similar under either the second or the fourth ground.
The dissent argued that section 29(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act,88 the anti-waiver provision, makes agreements to arbitrate liabilities under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act8 9 "void" and "inoperative." 9 The majority, however, held that the agreement to arbitrate
would be null and void only "if the inclusion of [the arbitration]
clause in the contract was the product of fraud or coercion."9 1 This
holding seems to be justified since the Convention intended the coverage of arbitration agreements to be very broad and it excluded only
"nugatory" contracts.9
As to the third ground, the public policy provision, the dissent
argued that section 29(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and the
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id., section I(a) of Article V.
S.Ex~c. Doc. E, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1968).
15 U.S.C. § 78a-78hh (1934).
Regarding the second ground of non-recognition of arbitration agreements, the

Convention did not define the law which governs the issue of whether the arbitral agreement is "null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed." Presumably, the

law specified'by the parties in their agreement should govern. Absent such a specification, the forum state may look to its own law and policy, or to the law of the place
of execution of the agreement, or to the law of the place where the dispute arose. See
Quigley, supra note 58, at 1064.
87. See RESrATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 4(1) and comment 4b to
§ 4(1) (1971); Boyer v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 38 Ill. 2d 31, 230 N.E.2d 173 (1967)
(holding that the Federal Safety Appliance Act is as much a part of the law and policy

of the states as are their own laws enacted by the state legislatures).
88. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1934).
89. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1934).
90. 417 U.S. at 527.
91. Id. at 519 n.14.
92.

Quigley, Convention on Foreign ArbitralAwards, 58 A.B.A.J. 821, 822 (1972).
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Wilko doctrine make clear that there is an overriding public policy to
give the courts exclusive jurisdiction of securities claims.9 3
It is true that the court of an enforcing country may refuse enforcement of an arbitration agreement which it finds contrary to its public
policy. In so doing, however, the exercise of the utmost good faith is
necessary. It has been said that the public policy provision "in effect
relegates the efficacy of the convention to the good faith of the contracting states.""' Therefore, if the United States is overready to defeat, on public policy grounds, an international arbitration agreement
sought to be enforced by a foreign contracting party, it would expose
its own nationals to the risk of being subjected to the same treatment
in the courts of foreign enforcing countries.9
Finally, the dissent seems to create the impression that the arbitration clause will leave Alberto-Culver without a remedy. However,
once the federal proceedings are stayed, Alberto-Culver can assert the
rule 10b-5 claim against Scherk in the forum where it specifically
agreed to settle all of its disputes with Scherk, the International
Chamber of Commerce in Paris.98 Who is to say that an arbitrated
settlement would be less favourable than a successful suit under the
securities laws? In fact, some parties may fare better in arbitration
than in litigation where judicially interpreted statutes may limit damages or standing to sue in certain instances. 97 Thus, such parties could
take an unfair advantage by agreeing to arbitration with intent to
abide by it only in those instances where litigation would be less advantageous. This type of international forum shopping is far from the
desirable course of conduct required to handle delicate international
trade relations.
CONCLUSION

The Court in Scherk was faced with the problem of reconciling two
93.
94.

95.

417 U.S. at 530-31 n.10.
Quigley, Convention on Foreign ArbitralAwards, 58 A.B.A.J. 821, 825 (1972).

See Brief for American Arbitration Association as Amicus Curiae at 16, Scherk

v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (citations omitted).
96. Justice Douglas considered that even if the ICC applies Rule lOb-5, "AlbertoCulver's victory would be Pyrrhic" since the ICC might not understand the rule. 417
U.S. at 532 n. 11. However, Scherck pointed out that:
mhe gist of Alberto-Culver's Rule lob-5 case is:
1. Did Mr. Scherk lie to Alberto-Culver about his trademarks?
2. If so, was the lie about a material fact. . . ?
3. If so, was Alberto-Culver deceived by the lie?
That analysis is certainly not beyond the ken of competent arbitrators.
Reply Brief for Petitioner at 5, Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
97. See Comment, Dumping Birnbaum To Force Analysis of the Standing Requirement Under Rule lOb-5-Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corporation, 6 LOYOLA
U. CHI. L.J. 230 (1975).
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conflicting congressional policies: the first protects the rights of purchasers of securities and voids any attempted waiver of those rights;
and the second encourages the arbitration of international commercial
disputes. The decision of the Court favouring the policy of enforcing
arbitration clauses in international commercial agreements made in
an arm's length negotiation by experienced businessmen, over the policy of giving the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction in securities
claims, recognizes that an arbitration agreement is almost indispensable to achieve the orderliness and predictability essential to any international business transaction.98
The decision of the Court is likely to result in a substantial increase
in the practice of businessmen to opt for arbitration as the exclusive
method of settling their disputes, thus avoiding the complex and uncertain proceedings of foreign courts. The alternative suggested by the
dissent, namely, exclusive federal court jurisdiction in all securities
disputes, is a provincial approach based on the supremacy of United
States law over the laws of other countries. Such an approach could
provoke similar reactions by the other member states to the United
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards and ruin the Convention's constructive approach to
the settlement of international disputes.
It can only be hoped that the courts in the other member states to
the United Nations Convention9 9 will follow the rationale set forth by
98.

417 U.S. at 516.

99. States which are parties to the Convention are:
Austria
Madagascar
Botswana
Bulgaria
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Rep.
Central African Republic
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
Ecuador
Egypt
Finland
France
Germany, Fed. Rep.
Ghana
Greece
Hungary
India
Israel

Italy

Japan
Khmer Rep.
Korea
It is expected that the United Kingdom will

Mexico
Morocco
Netherlands
Niger
Nigeria
Norway
Philippines
Poland
Romania
Sri Lanka (Ceylon)
Sweden
Switzerland
Syrian Arab Rep.
Tanzania
Thailand
Trinidad and Tobago

ranisia

Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Rep.
Union of Soviet Socialist Reps.
United States
accede to the Convention in the near future.

The Law Society's Gazette, vol. 72, no. 5, Feb. 5, 1975, at 1, col. 1.

756

1975

Case Comments

the United States Supreme Court and refrain from a parochial refusal
to enforce an international arbitration agreement, by resolving conflicting concepts of public policy in favour of the recognition of commercial arbitration agreements as a necessary element in maintaining
100
vital international trade.
MAMR JALILI

100.
(1975).

See Holtzmann, Arbitration in EastWest Trade, 9 INT'L LAWYER 77, 81
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